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any classics of international law have interest and importance both for the scholar and for the practical man whose career lies neither in the study nor in the lecture room.

EUGENE WAMBAUGH.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. A PERSONAL NARRATIVE. By Robert Lansing. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1921. pp. vi, 328.

This book is not what its title would seem to indicate, — a history of the Peace Conference at Paris. It is rather a record of the differences of opinion and the progressive estrangement which arose between President Wilson and his Secretary of State in connection with the peace negotiations and which led to Mr. Lansing's forced resignation a year later. The author writes with the moderation and dignity that were to be expected of him, paying not a few tributes to the high qualities of his former chief and offering adverse criticism of him with many hesitations and qualifications. Nevertheless, this is an *ex parte* statement, the proper evaluation of which is difficult until the case for the other side has also been heard.

In order to explain why he deemed it proper to publish such a book at such a time, Mr. Lansing cites the well-known correspondence between Mr. Wilson and himself of February, 1920, in which the President referred to the Secretary's obvious "reluctance" to accept his "guidance and direction," and declared that it would relieve him of embarrassment if Mr. Lansing would resign and afford him an opportunity to select some one "whose mind would more willingly go along with mine." In these words the author sees "the manifest imputation . . . that I had advised him wrongly and that, after he had decided to adopt a course contrary to my advice, I had continued to oppose his views and had with reluctance obeyed his instructions." It was in order to clear himself from this intolerable "imputation . . . of faithlessness and of a secret, if not open, avoidance of duty," that this book was published. Such reasons for writing do not seem very cogent. From an impartial reading of the letter in question, it is difficult to see that any such imputation was implied; and had it been, the present volume would not do much to refute it, for it throws little light upon how Mr. Lansing discharged his duties except in regard to the advice he tendered the President. The one thing it does prove is the reluctance of the former Secretary to accept the President's policies, that reluctance to which Mr. Wilson alluded and which Mr. Lansing himself does not in the least deny. "I followed his directions . . . with extreme reluctance, because I felt that President Wilson's policies were fundamentally wrong" — this is, indeed, the constant refrain of the book. It is in the exposition of these differences of opinion and of the reasons for them that the whole value of the volume lies.

Our two leading representatives at Paris differed continually, and on the most important questions. Mr. Lansing was opposed to the President's going to Paris, in the first place, to his personal participation in the Conference after he had got there, and to his whole method of conducting the negotiations. He regarded national self-determination — the principle on which most of the territorial work of the Peace Conference was based — as a "phrase . . . loaded with dynamite," and remarks, "What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered!" He condemned the President's yielding in the Shantung affair. He deplored the alliance treaty with France, to which he affixed his signature. Above all, he opposed and long struggled against the plans, not indeed for an association of nations, but for the particular League of Nations on which, more than on any other object, the President's mind was bent. In every case his advice was disregarded, sometimes not quite courteously, he

affirms. While thus reduced to the rôle of Cassandra, he still held it to be his duty to remain at his post, believing that "the supreme need of the world" was an immediate peace (however bad, apparently), and that his own withdrawal from the American Commission would so much embarrass the President and encourage his enemies as seriously to retard the conclusion of the treaty or, at least, its ratification at Washington.

The copious extracts which Mr. Lansing has printed from his memoranda to the President and from his diary during the Peace Conference do credit to his prophetic instincts: in many cases, notably with regard to Article X of the Covenant, he foresaw very accurately the vehement opposition that Mr. Wilson's policies would arouse in this country, and the arguments that would be invoked against them. This volume shows that the President was repeatedly warned of the perils of the course upon which he was entering, though it also shows that even Mr. Lansing did not foresee the actual rejection of the Peace Treaties by the Senate.

The arguments against Mr. Wilson's policies with which this book is filled, will inevitably arouse very different reactions in different readers. In the opinion of the reviewer, there is much that will not add to Mr. Lansing's reputation. For instance, while an advocate of making peace as quickly as ever possible, he holds that "the President . . . should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary Conference," thus raising the interesting mathematical problem: if it took six months to harmonize the views of five powers, how many years would it have taken to harmonize the views of the thirty-two nations represented in the plenary gatherings? He deplores the fact that the negotiations at Paris were not conducted with complete publicity, quite ignoring the almost insuperable difficulties, not to say dangers to the peace of the world, involved in such a procedure. His arguments against the constitutionality of the Covenant seem to the reviewer rather surprising in a lawyer of Mr. Lansing's standing and experience. And as against his view that the President ought to have contented himself with directing the peace negotiations from Washington, leaving the Secretary of State to head our delegation at Paris, this book itself supplies the most conclusive evidence. It was difficult enough as it was for the President to make his principles prevail to any large extent in the peace settlement; but what chances would he have had of carrying any points at all if he had been obliged to entrust the burden of the contest to a man who disagreed with him on almost every fundamental issue?

Whatever the merits of Mr. Lansing's *apologia*, there remains the question of the propriety of publishing it at this time. It is probable that in such a controversy an adequate rejoinder could not be written without detriment to the public interest. Mr. Lansing has invited judgment on the question whether his conduct has been "in accord with the best traditions of the public service of the United States." It was scarcely necessary to write a book to establish the affirmative, as far as his loyal performance of duty while in office is concerned, for no one has ever cast doubts upon it. But it may be seriously doubted whether the publication of such a book at the present time was in accord with the best traditions of our public service — or with the American instinct for fair play.

R. H. LORD.

MODERN DEMOCRACIES. By James Bryce. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1921. 2 vols. pp. 508, 609.

As a writer on history and politics James Bryce has been known throughout the English-speaking world for fifty years. It is almost exactly a half-